The Demographic Reckoning

The numbers don't lie, and they're brutal. Italy recorded a total fertility rate of just 1.18 in 2024—for every 1,000 people, only six babies were born while eleven died. Finland hit 1.25, its lowest since recordkeeping began in the late 19th century. Germany dropped to 1.35, the worst since 1994. Even Sweden, long Europe's fertility poster child, fell to a record-low 1.43.

The replacement rate—the magic 2.1 children per woman needed to maintain population without immigration—hasn't been seen anywhere in Europe for decades. Monaco, with its 39,000 residents, is the sole exception, and that's a statistical quirk.

What's striking isn't just the decline—it's the acceleration. These aren't gradual slides. Country after country is reporting 2024 as their worst year ever for births. The demographic math is unforgiving: each generation is now arriving one-third smaller than its parents. There's no policy intervention that reverses this in the next decade. The 2035 population structure is already determined by who was born—or wasn't—in 2010.

As native populations shrink, immigration has become Europe's demographic life support. The numbers tell the story: in 2010, 10% of EU residents were foreign-born. By 2024, that figure reached 14.1%—about 63 million people. That's a 40% increase in the immigrant share of the population in just 14 years.

The composition matters too. Of those 63.3 million, 71.4% came from outside the EU entirely. Germany's immigrant population surged from 11 million in 2015 to 17.4 million in 2024—a shift from 13.4% to 20.9% of its total population. Ukrainian, Turkish, and Moroccan citizens now form the three largest non-EU national groups.

Here's the critical dynamic: working-age migrants now represent 16.9% of Europe's working-age population, up from 12.2% in 2010. While the overall working-age population shrinks, migrants are an increasingly larger slice of who's actually working. This isn't a temporary phenomenon—it's structural.

Germany's Federal Statistical Office released its 16th coordinated population projection in late 2025, and the headline is stark: by 2035, one in four Germans will be 67 or older. That's up from one in five today. The baby boomers are leaving the workforce en masse, and the cohorts following them are dramatically smaller.

"The baby boomer generation is currently in the middle of transitioning from working life to retirement. Much smaller birth cohorts will follow," the agency states. By 2038, Germany will have 20.5 to 21.3 million people of pensionable age—an increase of 3.8 to 4.5 million compared to today.

Meanwhile, Germany's working-age population (20-66) currently stands at 51.2 million. All projection variants show this declining. Under high immigration assumptions, it drops to 45.3 million by 2070. Under moderate immigration, it falls to 41.2 million. Under low immigration, just 37.1 million.

The geographical picture is equally uneven. Berlin is projected to grow into a city of four million. Hamburg will expand. But seven of Germany's 16 states—mostly in the former East—will see their populations contract. The young leave for opportunity in the west; the old remain behind.

Eastern Europe faces a "dual demographic challenge": very low birth rates combined with high emigration. Since the EU expanded east in 2004, the flow has been relentless. Poland lost over a million people to western Europe. Romania lost 1.1 million residents between 2011 and 2021 alone—5.7% of its population in a single decade.

The projections are grim. Bulgaria's population is expected to decline 22.5% by 2050—from 6.8 million to 5.4 million. Poland faces a 14.8% drop, from 38.5 million to 32.8 million. Since 1989, when Eastern European nations left communism, 41% of those who've migrated west were Polish, 38% Romanian, and 9% Hungarian.

The brain drain statistics are particularly stark. The OECD estimates 20% of Slovak students leave to study abroad, compared to the EU average of 4%. In Hungary, 85% of emigrants are under 40, and 33% of those who leave have university degrees—versus 18% of the population that stayed. This isn't just population loss; it's selective population loss. The young and educated leave; the old and less mobile remain.

Pew Research projects Europe's Christian population will drop by roughly 100 million between 2010 and 2050—from 553 million to 454 million. The Christian share of Europe's population is expected to fall from 75% to 65%. The reasons are straightforward: Christians in Europe are older (median age 42 in 2010), and net religious switching flows away from Christianity toward the unaffiliated.

Meanwhile, Europe's Muslim population is projected to increase 63%—from 43 million in 2010 to 71 million in 2050. The Muslim share of Europe's population would nearly double, from under 6% to more than 10%. Under Pew's "high migration" scenario (assuming continued refugee flows), Muslims could reach 14% of Europe's population by 2050.

Even under a hypothetical "zero migration" scenario—if all immigration stopped immediately and permanently—the Muslim share would still rise from 4.9% to 7.4% by 2050, simply due to the younger age structure and higher fertility rates of Europe's existing Muslim population.

Here's the number that should keep policymakers up at night: Europe's working-age population (15-64) comprised 63.9% of the total in 2022. By 2100, Eurostat projects that will fall to 54.4%—a loss of 57.4 million working-age people in absolute terms. The sharpest decline hits by 2038.

The old-age dependency ratio—retirees per 100 working-age individuals—currently stands at 33.9%. It's projected to nearly double by 2100, reaching almost 60%. That means for every retiree, there will be fewer than two workers. Germany's numbers are even more striking: a dependency ratio that triples from 0.22 in the 1990s to 0.62 by 2060.

The OECD calculates that simply stabilizing the dependency ratio between 2015 and 2050 would require raising the retirement age by 8.4 years—far beyond any realistic pension reform. The math doesn't work without some combination of: dramatically increased immigration, massive productivity gains, or a fundamental restructuring of how societies support their elderly.